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1 OVERVIEW
In 2012 there was an increase in the contractionary pressures that had first become dis-
cernible in the world economy in the second half of the previous year. Aggregate growth 
fell to 3.2% and the divergence between the emerging and developed economies re-
mained in place, with the latter posting a rate of increase of only 1.3%. The decline in ac-
tivity was singularly severe in the euro area, whose GDP fell by 0.5% (see Chart 1.1). The 
contraction affected most of its 17 economies, and in the remainder output slowed, by 
almost 2 pp in the case of the largest countries. The growth of world trade also fell signifi-
cantly, while inflation eased in most countries.
Notable among the factors behind the loss of momentum in global activity was the wors-
ening of tensions in the euro area which, after two years of instability, experienced the 
most serious confidence crisis since the creation of the single currency, to the extent that 
the irreversibility of Economic and Monetary Union was called into question.
At the source of the euro confidence crisis was the fact that in an increasingly extensive 
group of economies a series of imbalances were becoming manifest. Ultimately, this 
reflected a lack of adaptation in the management of their domestic economic policies to 
the standards of stability required in a monetary union. When the perimeter of the prob-
lems spread to encompass some of the larger economies, such as Italy and Spain, the 
crisis took on a systemic dimension which tended to exacerbate the scope of its poten-
tial consequences.
In any event, the nature and generalisation of the tensions highlighted significant weak-
nesses in the architecture and governance of EMU, which strongly constrained the Eu-
ropean authorities’ response capacity and called into question the soundness of the 
euro project. It was thus evident that the mechanisms for coordinating and overseeing 
economic, fiscal and supply-side policies had been clearly unable to prevent and, in the 
circumstances, redress imbalances capable of endangering the sound functioning of 
the area. And it was likewise clear that the institutional framework was lacking the 
mechanisms needed to manage a crisis situation as deep-seated as that which ulti-
mately took shape.
To respond to the challenges of this serious crisis situation, major decisions have been 
taken in two domains. Regarding domestic economic policy management, greater impe-
tus and depth have been given to fiscal consolidation and to financial and structural re-
form aimed at correcting imbalances and making the economies more flexible, most par-
ticularly in countries where tensions have tended to concentrate to a greater extent. The 
European authorities have likewise set in train a review and reform of the institutional 
design and governance of the euro area, following the roadmap defined in the “Four 
Presidents’ Report”.
The response – despite its partial and in many cases hesitant nature – both at the Euro-
pean level, including in particular the ECB’s announcement of its Outright Monetary Trans-
actions (OMT) programme, and in the member countries allowed the most acute episodes 
of tension to be overcome, paving the way for the strengthening of the project and for 
ensuring its viability. However, as the events associated with the outcome of the Italian 
general elections and with the difficulties in agreeing on a financial assistance programme 
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for Cyprus show, sizable challenges remain. The nature and scope of the euro crisis, and 
the steps taken to overcome it, have decisively influenced the behaviour of the Spanish 
economy in 2012 and are a leading conditioning factor of the challenges it faces. Accord-
ingly, Chapter 2 of this Report is dedicated exclusively to analysing in depth the various 
facets of this crisis.
The Spanish economy faced the euro confidence crisis from a vulnerable position. The 
severity of the great recession of 2009-2010 had had far-reaching repercussions in terms of 
a sharp contraction in household and business spending and a forceful increase in unem-
ployment, which accelerated the deterioration in public finances and eroded the balance 
sheets of the banks most exposed to the real estate excesses of the expansionary phase.
The depth of the imbalances that had emerged and the need to correct them prevented the 
Spanish economy from joining in the pick-up in the world economy in the two years spanning 
2010 and 2011. The persistence of the underlying problems and the difficulties the necessary 
adjustment processes faced confined this reaction to very modest growth in the second half 
of 2010 and early 2011, which was lacking the underpinnings needed to take root.
The economic policy action taken from the time the sovereign debt crisis began had not been 
sufficient to counter the doubts over the soundness of the Spanish banking system, the sus-
tainability of public finances and the capacity to restore growth and absorb the high unem-
ployment that had built up during the first recession. In 2012, market doubts heightened as it 
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emerged that the public finances figures for the previous year involved slippage in the 
general government deficit of more than 2 pp the from the objective of 6.3% set under the 
Excessive Deficit Protocol (EDP), while the Bankia crisis revealed the persistence of fragili-
ties in the Spanish banking system. And this against a highly adverse macroeconomic 
background in which the absence of growth meant that headway in fiscal consolidation and 
the restructuring of the private sector was considerably more complicated.
The emergence of redenomination risk within the euro area in the summer months, strongly 
linked to growing speculation about the possibility of a Greek exit from the Monetary Union, 
increased financial instability in the more vulnerable economies (see Chart 1.2). In Spain the 
perception of the dangers inherent in a growing feedback loop between sovereign risk and 
banking risk worsened, sovereign debt yields reached their highest levels since the creation 
of the euro area (7.5% on the 10-year bond at end-July) and there was a notable acceleration 
in net capital outflows, rising from already-high figures in the second half of 2011. The confi-
dence crisis scourging the Spanish economy in this period ultimately became a severe bal-
ance of payments funding crisis, the first since joining the euro area (see Chart 1.3). This was 
an unprecedented event, laden with unknowns and challenges, that required a pressing and 
extraordinary response that would help restore credibility to the Spanish economy within the 
broader framework of action pursued by the European authorities to redress the complex 
problems underlying the euro crisis and to curb the risks of redenomination.
The generous liquidity provision policy pursued by the ECB since the onset of the crisis and 
some of the unconventional measures it adopted in response to the worsening situation 
helped compensate for the lack of external funds and circumvent the possibility of the financ-
ing of domestic spending being choked off. More specifically, credit institutions substantially 
increased their recourse to the Eurosystem, making use in particular of the opportunity pro-
vided by the two exceptional three-year liquidity tenders held in late 2011 and early 2012.1
The euro credibility crisis 
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serious external funding crisis
Generous liquidity provision by 
the ECB helped ease the 
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1  These long-term refinancing operations (LTROs) thus complemented the policy to lengthen maturities (six 
months, one year and, now, three years) and to increase the amount injected through this means that the ECB 
has been implementing since the start of the crisis.
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The easing in tensions also benefited from the fact that a fresh rise in the perception of a 
risk of reversal associated with the vicissitudes of the Greek economy was overcome. 
Moreover, the ECB stepped up its unconventional measures aimed at restoring the mon-
etary policy transmission mechanism, following the further deterioration in this mechanism 
prompted by the emergence of the risk of reversibility of the euro. In August it announced 
a programme of conditional purchases on the sovereign debt markets, which provided 
strong protection against such redenomination risk. In parallel, the June European summit 
discussed the key elements for a reform of the euro area and its governance, a process 
which received additional impetus following the decisions adopted in December on mov-
ing towards a European banking union, which should help loosen the link between sover-
eign and banking risks in the area.
Substantial steps were taken in Spain to speed through the clean-up, restructuring and 
recapitalisation of vulnerable Spanish banks. These included a financial aid programme for 
bank recapitalisation, which was requested by the Spanish government and agreed with 
the European institutions in July. There was also significant progress on public finances, 
following the approval of the Organic Law on Budgetary Stability and Financial Sustaina-
bility, which substantially strengthened the budgetary discipline framework by setting 
balanced-budget objectives for all levels of general government, caps on public debt, and 
requirements on transparency and the correction of slippage. In addition, the need to 
tackle the correction of a swollen deficit called for the adoption of various adjustment 
packages. These complemented the measures included in the State budget for 2012, in-
cluding most notably the health and education reforms in April, the revision of the regional 
government re-balancing plans in May and the application of the extensive package of 
measures in July, which included an increase in indirect tax, a cut in public-sector wages 
and the elimination of house-purchase tax relief as from 2013.
July also saw the entry into force of the Law on Urgent Labour Market Reform Measures, 
which broadened the possibilities for the decentralisation of collective bargaining, in-
creased internal flexibility at firms and rationalised the conditions for the determination 
of permanent contracts. Lastly, various measures were adopted during 2012 aimed at 
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liberalising certain sectors and promoting competitiveness, and a Plan for the Payment of 
Suppliers was introduced which contributed to easing corporate sector liquidity constraints.
In combination, this broad set of measures managed to halt the negative spiral in the sum-
mer. The easing of financial tensions surrounding the euro and the advance of reforms 
helped reduce the pressures on the cost of Spanish public debt, and external funding mar-
kets reopened. Both processes have continued in 2013 to date, although the situation has 
not normalised in full, meaning that domestic interest rates do not yet fully reflect the ex-
pansionary stance of the single monetary policy. Credit, meantime, continues to contract.
Against this enormously complex background, the Spanish economy went in late 2011 
into a second recession, one less acute but more protracted than the first (between the 
second half of 2008 and late 2009). This double-dip in output, which spans the entire pe-
riod under analysis in this Report, is unprecedented and poses major challenges. GDP 
shrank by 1.4% over the year on average, after its rate of decline had stepped up in the 
final quarter, when a series of temporary factors – linked chiefly to the greater budgetary 
consolidation drive undertaken in these months – combined with other more persistent 
ones. In this respect, the adverse funding conditions and the downturn in confidence ex-
acerbated the fall-off in domestic demand, which dropped 3.9%, owing to the continuing 
real estate correction, the adjustment in private-sector balance sheets and the impact of 
fiscal consolidation. All these factors, present since the start of the crisis, bore down on 
private-sector demand, whose determinants were in a position of great fragility. Net exter-
nal demand continued to be the only underpinning of activity, contributing 2.5 pp to out-
put, although the weakening in the euro area during the year limited this cushioning effect, 
especially in the final months.
The decline in domestic demand affected all its components: consumption and invest-
ment, in public and private sector alike. The climate of uncertainty, the difficult financial 
conditions, the bleaker outlook for the labour market, the decline in disposable income 
and the fall in financial and non-financial wealth reduced household spending, in terms 
both of consumption and residential investment. Only the saving ratio, which fell once 
more to 8.2% of disposable income, less than half its level in 2009, helped soften to some 
extent the pattern of adjustment of household consumption. However, the abrupt decline 
in the saving ratio since the start of the crisis reflects the difficulties of household spend-
ing being sustained in the immediate future, in a setting in which the still-high level of 
household debt must continue to fall. Residential investment remained restricted by the 
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depth of the correction of past real estate excesses and fell for the fifth year running, 
against the backdrop of weak housing demand, the continuing decline in real estate pric-
es and the persistently high stock of unsold housing, which set back the start of new 
construction (see Chart 1.4). Business investment was likewise affected by an adverse 
financial environment and by a relatively unfavourable outlook for domestic and external 
demand.
The considerable effort made to respond to fiscal consolidation requirements exerted an 
inevitable contractionary impact on spending and activity. The fall in government con-
sumption reflected the decline in purchases and in public-sector employment, for the first 
time since the crisis began, in response to the application of the regional government fi-
nancial re-balancing plans, adding to the adjustment previously begun by central govern-
ment. The collapse in public investment (38% for the year on average) was impacted by 
civil engineering work grinding to a halt, which affected the projects jointly undertaken with 
non-financial corporations. Under the restrictive fiscal policy stance in 2012, mention 
should however be made of the counter-effect of other measures (mainly the Payments to 
Suppliers Plan which, conceived to settle outstanding local and regional government pay-
ables to firms and sole proprietors, entailed the injection of €27 billion mid-year).
On the supply side, the figures for all the productive sectors worsened in relation to 2011, 
except for agriculture. The increases in value added in industry and in market services of 
the past two years turned negative in 2012, while the contraction in construction in-
creased, owing to the marked decline in the non-residential segment. Employment fell by 
4.4%, partly as a result of the above-mentioned decline in public procurement. But em-
ployment in the remaining productive sectors also fared very unfavourably (with a decline 
of 4.9% for the year on average), a figure much influenced in any event by the poor per-
formance in late 2011 and early 2012. The unemployment rate rose sharply to 26% of the 
labour force in 2012 Q4, in a slightly contractionary demographic setting (27.2% in 2013 
Q1). Indeed, in 2012 the labour force fell for the first time since the start of the crisis, as a 
result of the decline in the working-age population, caused in turn by the fall-off in the 
foreign population (see Chart 1.5).
The unfavourable performance of employment is having very adverse repercussions on struc-
tural unemployment, it amplifies the contractionary trend of expenditure and it hampers the 
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attainment of speedier headway in the correction of certain imbalances, such as the fiscal 
maladjustment and private-sector indebtedness. However, the persistence of the reces-
sionary environment is, along with the reforms undertaken, giving impetus to the adjust-
ment of costs and, to a lesser extent, of prices, bringing about the necessary internal 
devaluation and the elimination of the external deficit. The results obtained on both fronts, 
whose significance and scope are analysed in depth elsewhere in this Report, have been 
better than expected and evidence the progress in the adjustments of the economy, 
though these are still incomplete.
The pattern of containment of labour costs begun two years earlier made further inroads. 
Economy-wide compensation per employee fell by 0.3%, after having increased at rates 
of 0.3% and 0.7% in 2010 and 2011, respectively. The fall in public-sector wages, owing 
to the elimination of the extra December payment, also played a key role here, although 
remuneration in the market economy likewise moved on a moderating course, posting a 
rate of increase of 0.6%. The progressive containment of wage settlements in new col-
lective bargaining agreements, in which the weight of past inflation has been substan-
tially lessened as has too the percentage of agreements with an inflation indexation 
clause, reflects the incipient impact of the labour market reforms on collective bargain-
ing dynamics (see Box 1.1). Unit labour costs declined for the third year running, as a 
result also of the increase in productivity, prompting a further correction of the differen-
tials with the euro area. It is crucial for this trajectory to firm if employment is to begin to 
be generated.
Inflation showed greater volatility during the year owing to the impact of the rises in en-
ergy prices and of the hike in VAT and in administered prices, which prompted an accel-
eration in the inflation rate in the second half of the year, taking the end-year annual rate 
to 2.9%. It is estimated that the impact of the rise in VAT from 1 September was only 
partly reflected in final prices, which is consistent with the ongoing extreme weakness of 
spending. Yet underlying inflation adjusted for these effects remained at relatively moder-
ate levels. In April this year, the year-on-year rate of CPI inflation was 1.4%, and that of 
the CPI excluding unprocessed food and energy was 1.9%, with both rates still being 
affected by the aforementioned temporary factors. As these effects are progressively 
erased, inflation should resume a more moderate path, as should the inflation gap with 
the euro area (see Chart 1.6).
In turn, the decline in the nation’s net borrowing intensified in 2012, finally standing at 
0.2% of GDP for the year as a whole (3.2% in 2011), following a second half of the year 
in which net lending capacity was generated for the first time since 1995. From the stand-
point of the institutional sectors, this improvement was due exclusively to the surplus of 
non-financial corporations’ saving over investment, which increased their financing to 
3.5% of GDP (compared with a deficit of 10.7% of GDP in 2007). By contrast, the declin-
ing trajectory of households’ net borrowing continued for another year and general gov-
ernment net borrowing increased, ending the year with a deficit of 10.6% of GDP. How-
ever, the budget deficit narrowed to 7% of GDP once the impact of the financial aid was 
stripped out.
Despite the sharp reduction in the nation’s net borrowing, the demand for funds to roll over 
maturities on the burgeoning external debt was most substantial and difficult to meet on 
the markets. In 2012 as a whole, net outflows accounted for 17% of GDP, which made 
recourse by the banking system to Eurosystem liquidity vital, as earlier indicated. This 
trajectory reversed as from September last year.
Labour costs eased further…
… but inflation quickened in 
the second half of the year 
owing to the impact of the rise 
in indirect tax and in 
administered prices
The external deficit narrowed 
substantially in 2012
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One of the most important characteristics of the economic expan-
sion experienced by the Spanish economy before the current crisis 
was the gradual loss of competitiveness, as measured, for exam-
ple, by the growth of unit labour costs relative to the average for the 
euro area countries (see Panel 4). During the crisis, however, this 
imbalance has been partially corrected, which means that a signifi-
cant part of the cost competitiveness losses accumulated since 
1998 have been reversed. The gap, however, remains considerable 
in relation to the most competitive euro area countries, reaching 18 pp 
in 2012 in the case of costs relative to Germany.
Most of the correction of accumulated competitiveness losses has 
been based on the increase in productivity arising from the intensity 
of labour shedding. Indeed, at the start of the crisis the rate of 
growth of compensation per employee continued to exceed the av-
erage euro area rate, and in 2012, after two years of wage modera-
tion, it was still only three points below the relative level observed in 
2008. Against this background, it is essential that the contribution of 
wage restraint to the fall in unit labour costs should be stepped up 
to ensure a sustainable recovery in the Spanish economy.
The various labour-market reforms adopted in recent years have 
sought to make the wage-determination process more flexible. In 
particular, firms have been afforded greater opportunities to adapt 
their wage and non-wage conditions to changes in the economic 
environment or in their own particular conditions, so as to reduce 
the need to adjust employment in response to adverse shocks. 
The functioning of the labour market in recent months is analysed 
below, to see to what extent changes can be detected in wage 
and employment behaviour during the double-dip recession in 
the Spanish economy. However, it is still too soon to make a de-
finitive diagnosis of the effectiveness of the different reforms, and 
in particular to distinguish the effect of cyclical factors on the evo-
lution of the labour market from effects arising from legislative 
changes.
With regard to wage developments, although a certain delay has 
built up in the collective bargaining conducted in 2012 and in the 
first few months of 2013, which may limit the representativeness 
of the available data, there would appear to be signs of greater 
wage moderation, with increases in compensation per employee 
BOX 1.1CHANGES IN THE FUNCTIONING OF THE LABOUR MARKET
SOURCES: Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social and Eurostat.
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BOX 1.1CHANGES IN THE FUNCTIONING OF THE LABOUR MARKET (cont’d)
of practically zero in the private sector in the last three quarters 
and less nominal inertia in collective bargaining. In fact, wage 
settlements fell to 1.3% in December 2012, from 2.5% a year 
earlier, while the data available for 2013, albeit still very unrepre-
sentative, show a reduction in the average wage settlement to 
0.6%. Analysing the data for 2012 in greater detail, the wage 
moderation was observed both in revised agreements and in 
newly signed ones, but especially in the latter kind, in which the 
wage settlement stood at 0.7% in December 2012. This wage 
settlement is close to the recommendations agreed by the social 
agents at the beginning of the year (0.5%) and is well below the 
rate of inflation. Also, in these new agreements, a certain in-
crease in wage dispersion1 can be seen, as well as a higher pro-
portion of agreements with nominal wage reductions or freezes, 
despite the rise in inflation at the end of 2012 (see Panel 3). In 
relation to 2013, the information for the period to April shows 
very low wage settlements in newly signed agreements (0.2%), 
which would indicate further wage moderation in this year’s col-
lective bargaining, although these agreements still only affect a 
small group of workers (383,000).
At the same time, a gradual decline is observed in the extent of 
wage indexation, as measured by the percentage of workers cov-
ered by indexation clauses. This percentage, which has tradition-
ally stood between 60% and 70%, fell to 45% in 2012. The reduc-
tion was more pronounced in the case of newly signed agree-
ments, the percentage of those with indexation clauses falling to 
33%. Among these newly signed agreements, it can be seen that 
around 75% of them observe, at least partially, the recommenda-
tions of the Employment and Collective Bargaining Agreement 
(AENC) signed by the social agents at the beginning of the year. In 
particular, an analysis of newly signed agreements since the be-
ginning of 2012 shows that around half only provide for activation 
of indexation clauses from 2%, while around 25% use European 
instead of Spanish inflation as their nominal reference, which fur-
ther reduces the indexation of wage increases. According to the 
first available data, these developments have translated into a 
considerably lower impact of indexation clauses in 2012 (0.25 pp), 
when, given the rise in inflation at end-2012 (2.9%), an impact of 
close to 1 pp would have been expected if the behaviour of previ-
ous years had remained unchanged. All in all, wage developments 
are beginning to reflect a greater response to the specific situation 
of firms and sectors of activity, in line with the objective pursued 
by the labour reform. However no significant changes are ob-
served in the structure of bargaining, the relative weight of firm-level 
1  Measured by the coefficient of variation of wage settlements in newly 
signed agreements.
SOURCE: INE (EPA).
a ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
2008 Q2 - 2010 Q1 2010 Q2 - 2011 Q1 2011 Q2 - 2012 Q1 2012 Q2 - 2012 Q4
Employment out?o?s (% employment in t - 1)
    Total 7.8 7.4 7.8 7.8
    Market 8.5 8.0 8.4 8.4
    Non-market 4.3 4.7 5.3 5.1
Employment out?o?s by type of contract (% employment in t - 1)
    Permanent 1.8 1.5 1.7 1.9
    Temporary 12.8 14.5 15.8 17.1
Employment out?o?s by type of contract and sector (% employment in t - 1)
    Permanent-market 2.1 1.9 2.1 2.3
    Temporary-market 14.1 15.8 17.1 18.6
    Permanent-non-market 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
    Temporary-non-market 7.1 9.4 10.6 11.3
Unemployment out?o?s (% unemployment in t - 1)
    Total 39.7 32.7 30.4 28.7
    To employment 23.0 18.4 16.8 15.7
    To temporary employment 18.2 15.0 13.7 12.8
    To permanent employment 1.7 1.3 1.3 1.2
EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT OUTFLOWS, IN DIFFERENT PHASES OF THE CRISIS (a) 
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BOX 1.1CHANGES IN THE FUNCTIONING OF THE LABOUR MARKET (cont’d)
agreements being very similar to that observed previously. Also, 
the information to assess the effectiveness of the set of measures 
adopted to facilitate opt-outs from sectoral agreements and to 
modify the labour conditions agreed in collective agreements is 
still very limited.
By contrast, in the employment sphere no changes are observed in 
recent patterns of employment creation and destruction. In particu-
lar, outflows from employment (see adjoining table) have remained 
at very high levels and are characterised by significant numbers of 
temporary employees, both in the public and in the private sector. 
As regards workers’ characteristics, outflows remained higher for 
foreign employees, partly owing to the greater intensity of job loss-
es that continued to be seen in the construction sector. With regard 
to employment creation, the downward trend in the rate of outflow 
from unemployment has been maintained. In this respect, it might 
be thought that more time is needed to begin to detect changes in 
the labour market adjustment dynamics, since the different chang-
es introduced, in relation to both collective and individual dismiss-
als, and their interaction with the wage bargaining process should 
lead to a more balanced division of adjustment between temporary 
and permanent workers, reducing the high degree of duality that 
characterises the Spanish labour market. The information available 
is still very preliminary, although it suggests that changes in the 
definition of dismissal on economic grounds would have permitted 
around 40% of the individual dismissals to be carried out on these 
grounds (as against 10%-15% in the first phase of the crisis), while 
the data on the composition of collective dismissals show that 
most of them are not redundancies, but reductions in hours worked 
(22%) and temporary lay-offs (61%).
In short, in recent quarters a pattern of wage moderation has been 
observed, the continuation of which is vital to accelerate the rever-
sal of competitiveness losses in the Spanish economy and, there-
by, establish the foundations for higher economic growth in future, 
permitting a lasting reduction in the rate of unemployment.
The double-dip recession reached its nadir in the transition from 2012 to 2013, and this 
episode may be expected to be gradually overcome during the present year. The prospect 
of a recovery taking root depends on the external setting and on progress in the adjust-
ments under way in the Spanish economy, which are pivotal to confidence being restored 
and external funding being maintained.
The Spanish economy is immersed in a far-reaching adjustment process under highly ad-
verse circumstances. Financial conditions remain very strict despite the receding of ten-
sions in the euro area, and there is no significant leeway to resort to demand-stimulating 
macroeconomic policies other than that potentially stemming from the normalisation of the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism, which at present is still impaired. It will fall on 
supply-side and structural reform policies to play a decisive role in restoring domestic and 
external confidence and in boosting medium and long-term growth, helping ease the 
short-term effects of the adjustment process.
The pace and scope of adjustments will be the chief determinants of the strength and 
sustainability of the recovery. Assessing these processes is the most important aspect of 
the analysis of current economic conditions and of the outlook for growth. There follows a 
selective analysis of these adjustments, successively addressing external re-balancing, 
budgetary consolidation, private-sector deleveraging and, lastly, the restructuring of the 
banking system.
The loss of competitiveness, the swollen external imbalance (driven, in part, by the pres-
sure of domestic spending) and high dependence on external saving were key ingredients 
in the deterioration in the Spanish economy once the international financial crisis, the great 
recession and the sovereign debt crisis changed investors’ attitude to risk and prompted 
3  Progress in adjustment 
processes
The economy is in the midst of 
an adjustment process under 
very strict financial conditions, 
in which supply-side and 
structural reform policies must 
play a key role in restoring 
confidence and boosting 
growth
The sustainability of the 
recovery will depend on the 
pace and scope of the 
adjustments pending
3.1  RESTORING 
COMPETITIVENESS AND 
EXTERNAL RE-BALANCING
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a major redeployment of cross-border financing. In these conditions, improved competi-
tiveness and the correction of the external imbalance have become fundamental require-
ments for recovery in the Spanish economy.
Achieving substantial improvements in competitiveness is vital for ensuring that the exter-
nal sector can continue to cushion the impact of domestic demand, which will be subject, 
for some time, to the effects of private-sector deleveraging and of budgetary consolida-
tion. Looking ahead to the medium term, a more export-oriented productive model in 
which the weight of tradeable activities is greater will promote a more balanced allocation 
of productive resources and this, in turn, will be conducive to less import dependence. In 
addition, to resolve the problem of excessive external debt, it is vital to sustainably redress 
the balance of payments situation.
Within the euro area, and without the possibility of using the exchange rate as an eco-
nomic policy instrument, the only means of restoring competitiveness and reabsorbing the 
misalignments of relative prices to countries belonging to the euro area is by means of an 
adjustment of costs and prices, along with productivity gains, derived from more efficient 
economic functioning.
In Spain, the losses in competitiveness were most sizable during the first decade of 
euro area membership, against a background in which the characteristics of product 
Improved competitiveness and 
the correction of the external 
imbalance are central 
objectives of economic policy
Headway in competitiveness 
will make the external sector 
the engine of growth and will 
help in the difficult task of 
attaining a lasting 
improvement in the external 
accounts
Restoring competitiveness 
within the euro area requires 
adjustments, in comparative 
terms, of wages, productivity 
and margins
The price-competitiveness 
indices show improvements,
SOURCES: Eurostat and Banco de España.
a Year-on-year rates with sign changed.
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and factor markets prevented the adjustment channel of relative prices and costs from 
operating properly. This lack of response by nominal variables to cyclical requirements 
continued during the initial years following the international financial crisis, contributing 
to deepening the job destruction process. That meant that the incipient improvements 
in the competitiveness indices resided solely on the productivity gains generated by 
such job reduction. Subsequently, wages moved onto a path of moderation, which be-
came steeper in 2012, while productivity continued to increase over these years, in 
tandem with the prolongation of the negative labour market trajectory. Margins, for their 
part, have followed a countercyclical path, partly owing to the aim of companies to re-
store health to their balance sheets and be better placed to withstand the difficult finan-
cial situation, although increases in margins also reflect the persistence of a lack of 
competition in certain sectors.
Overall, the various indices approximating developments in price-competitiveness en-
compass improvements of differing degrees of intensity, which are more pronounced 
when unit labour costs (ULCs) are used. For the market economy as a whole, ULCs have 
shown a 7 pp decline since 2009 Q3 (when they began their declining course), which en-
tails a correction of two-thirds of the difference with the euro area that had built up since 
the start of EMU. In turn, the correction of the difference in terms of ULCs for the whole 
economy was already completed in 2012, although behaviour in this latter year was much 
influenced by the decline in public-sector wages.
The correction of the external deficit that began mutedly in 2007 was much more forceful 
in 2012, with the balance of this item standing at -0.2% of GDP. The projections available 
suggest that the surplus on the balance of payments in the final stretch of last year will 
firm, and that this trajectory will run into 2014.
A component-by-component analysis shows that the reduction in borrowing requirements 
since 2007 (of 9 pp of GDP) has been chiefly based on the improvement in the trade balance 
of non-energy goods, the deficit on which has been cut by 6.5 pp to turn into a surplus in 
2012. Foreign trade in services has contributed in the same direction, albeit for a lesser 
amount (1.5 pp), owing to the change of sign in the balance of non-tourist services and to 
the maintenance of a surplus on tourist services corresponding to pre-crisis levels, albeit 
with some oscillations over the course of these years. Conversely, the considerable weight 
accounted for by the energy deficit and the income deficit act as a brake on the room 
available for lending capacity to improve.
The reduction in net borrowing in 2012 followed a similar pattern to that described for 
the period as a whole, except as regarded the investment income deficit, which fell as 
a result of lower interest rates and the change in the composition of the International 
Investment Position (IIP), both of which factors are essentially temporary in nature (see 
Chart 1.7).
From the standpoint of the relative contribution of exports and imports to the improved 
foreign trade balance, somewhat more than two-thirds of this reflects the increase in ex-
ports (with an increase in the intensive margin but also in the export base), and the remain-
der the fall in imports, chiefly as a result of weak demand. This development, combined 
with the information provided by indicators of the more or less structural nature of the 
adjustment, indicates that cyclical factors have played a key role in this adjustment, al-
though the weight of the gains in competitiveness is acquiring increasing significance in 
the correction of the external imbalance.
more markedly so in terms
of unit labour costs
The reduction of the external 
deficit quickened in 2012,
to the point of its virtual 
elimination
Since 2007, only investment 
income and the energy bill 
have checked the 
improvement in lending 
capacity
The external sector 
adjustment has been 
underpinned by the weakness 
of domestic spending but also 
by the gains in 
competitiveness
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The reduction in the external deficit has provided for a halt in the expansionary dynamic of 
the external liabilities position, which peaked at almost 94% of GDP in 2009, one of the 
highest in the euro area. However, in 2012 the IIP was still at over 90% of GDP. The foreign 
trade balance, once the income deficit was stripped out, posted a surplus of around 1.6% 
of GDP, placing the Spanish economy in a sound position to begin to correct the debit bal-
ance. Nonetheless, given the foreseeable course of the energy and income sub-balances 
in the short run, and the fact that their deficit may only be corrected gradually, it is vital to 
continue generating gains in competitiveness that boost net goods and services exports 
and increase the primary balance of payments.
In sum, despite the sharp correction in the external imbalance, the sector shows a series 
of fragilities that must be overcome to ensure that the surplus and the reduction in the in-
ternational debit position can be maintained in a higher growth phase.
The fiscal consolidation process that had begun in 2010 continued in the Spanish econo-
my in 2012. General government borrowing amounted to 10.6% of GDP, though it should 
be borne in mind that this figure includes the impact arising from the aid granted to finan-
cial institutions, which increased public spending through the capital transfers item, by 
3.6% of GDP. If this effect is stripped out, the general government deficit fell from 2009 by 
4.2 pp to 7%, while the public debt ratio climbed by 50 pp, from its 2007 minimum to 
84.2% of GDP in 2012 (a rise of 30.3 pp since 2009) (see Chart 1.8).
Reducing the budget deficit is proving costly, as shown by the fact that the major measures 
adopted, both in terms of the range of budgetary items affected and of the scale of the adjust-
ments implemented, have translated into limited advances, with a still-high deficit figure (see Box 
1.2). The reduction since 2009 in the primary structural deficit, totalling 6.5 pp when the financial 
aid is not included, illustrates most clearly the magnitude of the fiscal effort made.
Among the difficulties the budgetary consolidation is facing, mention should first be 
made of the growing weight of the interest burden, which has doubled as a percentage 
of GDP (up to 3% in 2012). Secondly, the fact that this process is unfolding under 
highly adverse economic conditions entails an acceleration in the spending items most 
linked to the business cycle (essentially unemployment benefits) and a reduction in 
The increase in net external 
debt has been halted, but its 
reduction in a phase of higher 
growth must be ensured
3.2 FISCAL CONSOLIDATION
Budgetary consolidation 
progressed in 2012, in a 
process that is proving 
costly…
… as a result of the growing 
weight of the interest burden, 
adverse cyclical conditions 
and the characteristics of the 
process of adjustment in the 
economy
SOURCES: INE, Customs and Banco de España.
a The energy and non-energy balance are a Banco de España estimate drawing on Customs data.
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revenue-raising capacity. And it is along these same lines that the characteristics of the 
process of adjustment in the Spanish economy are acting; as indicated, the external 
sector is proving to be the only source of improvement in activity, which limits the ex-
pansion potential of tax receipts.
Fiscal consolidation has to date been concentrated to a greater extent on the side of pub-
lic spending than on that of revenue, with a very high weight of the adjustment in capital 
spending (in particular in public investment and, to a lesser extent, in employee compen-
sation, which stood in 2012 at 40% and 90%, respectively, of their 2009 levels). In the case 
of tax, there were across-the-board increases under all headings, albeit with a bias to-
wards indirect as opposed to direct taxation.
The adjustment drive was initially concentrated on central government, and in particular in 
2012 this extended to regional and local government, which significantly reduced their im-
balances that year following the doubts raised about their adjustment capacity in the previ-
ous years. Conversely, there has been a gradual deterioration in the Social Security bal-
ance, which went into deficit in 2012 (-1% of GDP, or -3.2% net of transfers received 
mainly from the State), as a result of the combination of the upward dynamics in pension 
spending – determined essentially by demographic trends – and the impact of adverse la-
bour market developments on social security contributions and unemployment benefits.
The new Law on Budgetary Stability and Financial Sustainability contributed in its first year 
to reinforcing transparency in respect of the information on regional governments’ budget 
outturns, which should facilitate the application of the law’s preventive arm. The latter in-
cludes procedures to correct marked budgetary slippage, which have not been applied yet.
Regional governments’ difficulties in obtaining funding on the markets and the delays in 
payments to suppliers have been addressed by setting in place various central govern-
ment-intermediated financial support funds for regional and local government (the Re-
gional Government Liquidity Fund and the Plan for Payments to Suppliers), whose use 
entails complying with the agreed adjustment plans. The balanced implementation of the 
mechanisms provided by law in cases where there is observed slippage from the objec-
tives set in the aforementioned adjustment plans is vital for preventing this type of aid from 
generating inappropriate incentives.
The adjustment has been 
greater on the expenditure 
than on the revenue side, 
albeit with a sizeable bias 
towards capital spending
In terms of agents, the 
reduction in the general 
government deficit was the 
outcome of the drive to 
contain the various sub-
agents, except the Social 
Security system
The new Law on Budgetary 
Stability and Financial 
Sustainability was applied for 
the first time in 2012
SOURCES: IGAE and Banco de España.
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BOX 1.2THE IMPACT OF FISCAL POLICY ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
The deterioration of the fiscal position has been one of the most 
widespread consequences of the economic and financial crisis 
among the developed countries. In the specific case of the euro 
area, this deterioration, along with doubts about growth pros-
pects, uncertainty about the costs of bank system restructuring 
and shortcomings in euro area governance, was the event that 
triggered the sovereign debt crisis which commenced in Greece 
and subsequently spread to the other peripheral countries. The 
European authorities understood from the outset that a number of 
measures would be required to overcome the crisis, including, as 
a priority, the monitoring of fiscal consolidation, which most coun-
tries started in 2010 to regain the confidence of international mar-
kets and ensure that public debt dynamics do not become unsus-
tainable.
The implementation of fiscal consolidation has been subject to dif-
ficulties, resulting in many cases in repeated failure to achieve the 
fiscal targets initially set. Against this background, there has been 
an intense debate over the appropriate speed and extent of fiscal 
adjustment. An important part of this debate has focused on anal-
ysis of the value of so-called “fiscal multipliers”. This box analyses 
this question, providing empirical evidence for the case of Spain 
and discussing its implications for the pace of fiscal consolidation.
The high degree of uncertainty regarding the macroeconomic ef-
fects of fiscal policy should be recognised. In particular, the short-
run impact of the budget deficit on the growth rate depends on a 
very broad set of conditions, such as the composition of the ad-
justment (how it is distributed between spending cuts and tax in-
creases), the cyclical position, the initial levels of debt, the behav-
iour of monetary policy and the exchange rate regime. The litera-
ture has emphasised the possibility that the so-called “fiscal 
multipliers” are greater in macroeconomic situations like the cur-
rent ones, of economic recession and/or financial crisis, as there 
are more idle resources in the economy and/or agents may be 
more constrained, or in which monetary policy is unable to offset 
the effects of the fiscal contraction, because nominal interest rates 
are close to the zero lower bound. For the specific case of Spain, 
these fiscal multipliers have been estimated under different cir-
cumstances (see accompanying table). In general, the importance 
of taking macroeconomic conditions into account when anticipat-
ing the effects of fiscal policy is confirmed. In particular, it can be 
seen that public spending multipliers (consumption and public in-
vestment) are higher at times of economic recession and financial 
stress, although the differences in their value compared with ex-
pansionary phases are lower than those estimated for the United 
States.1
Likewise, Blanchard and Leigh (2013), in a recent influential paper, 
provide evidence to show that during the economic crisis the 
IMF’s macroeconomic projections have been systematically opti-
mistic and that these errors are correlated with the magnitude of 
the planned fiscal adjustment. This would suggest that the restric-
tive effects of fiscal consolidation are proving to be greater than 
those derived from the multipliers used in the macroeconomic 
projection models (which, although it depends on the fiscal instru-
ment used, would generally be less than 0.5). However, the evi-
dence provided seems to suggest that these conclusions cannot 
be extrapolated to all the countries analysed. In this respect, a 
similar analysis has been performed for Spain, in which, first, the 
forecast errors observed for the Spanish economy in the Eurosys-
tem forecast exercises are calculated, correcting them for the im-
pact of the observed changes in the external assumptions, including 
the fiscal ones, with respect to those used at the time the forecasts 
SOURCES: Hernández de Cos and Moral-Benito (2013).
NOTE: * statistically signi?cant to 5%.
a The multipliers in the table show the response by GDP to a €1 reduction in public spending. 
Multiplier for a negative public spending shock (a)
Regime four quarters after shock eight quarters after shock
    Expansion -0.47 * -0.25 *
    Recession -1.15 * -1.67 *
    No ?scal stress -0.73 * -0.31 *
    Fiscal stress -0.12 -0.16
    No ?nancial stress -0.61 * -0.06
    Financial stress -0.96 * -0.89 *
  
1  When estimating the multipliers for states of economic expansion/reces-
sion, financial stress/no financial stress and fiscal stress/no fiscal stress 
shown in the table below, such states were approximated on the basis 
of the output gap, the aggregate default rate and changes in the level of 
public debt, respectively. The states of expansion/recession were alter-
natively approximated on the basis of real GDP growth and the unem-
ployment rate, the financial crisis/no financial crisis ones on the basis of 
the flow of credit to the private sector and the fiscal stress /no fiscal 
stress ones on the basis of the ratio of public debt to GDP and the 
budget deficit, and the results did not change significantly. On the other 
hand, the differences between regimes in the multipliers presented in the 
table are, generally, statistically significant.
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were made (see Panel 1). The conclusions of this analysis are, first, 
that the forecast errors have not always had the same sign and, 
second, that these forecast errors are not negatively correlated 
with the fiscal consolidation initially planned, which does not pro-
vide support, in the Spanish case, for the idea that the multipliers 
may be significantly higher in the current situation than the ones 
incorporated in the forecast models.
Given the possible effect of fiscal policy on agents’ confidence, 
the literature has also emphasised the possibility that multipliers 
may be lower, or even negative, in situations of fiscal stress, which 
may also be relevant in the current situation given the observed 
increases in public debt-to-GDP ratios and risk premiums. In this 
respect, evidence is found, for the Spanish case, that multipliers 
are lower in situations of fiscal stress identified by abnormally 
large increases in the level of government debt (see accompany-
ing table).
The determination of the level of fiscal stress is related to the 
concepts currently being discussed in the economic literature of 
BOX 1.2THE IMPACT OF FISCAL POLICY ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (cont’d)
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Adjusted for slippage in the exogenous assumptions: the MTBE is used to approximate how the forecast would have changed had correct assumptions originally 
adjustment is not applied.
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“fiscal limit” and “debt threshold”. The latter may be defined as 
the level of government debt that the markets implicitly take as 
a reference, above which an economy would begin to find itself 
having difficulty financing itself on the markets at costs compat-
ible with its fundamentals, insofar as above that debt limit 
agents would begin to perceive risks to the sustainability of the 
country’s public finances. The evidence available for Spain on 
this question [see Andrés et al. (2013)] suggests that the current 
level of public debt is close to this threshold, so that anchoring 
the expectations of agents to the stabilisation of debt at these or 
lower levels would help to mitigate the pressures on their financ-
ing costs.
Given these considerations, it may be concluded that the fiscal 
adjustment strategy should take into account not only the behav-
iour of economic activity, but also the costs of excessive delays in 
consolidation, in terms of risks to credibility and their impact on 
agents’ confidence. In this respect, it is important to ask how high 
fiscal multipliers would need to be in order for fiscal consolidation 
to generate an increase in the public debt-to-GDP ratio, i.e. to 
have the opposite impact to that intended (known as a “self-de-
feating consolidation”). For this purpose a simulation exercise was 
performed using the quarterly model of the Banco de España 
(MTBE), in order to analyse the effect of a fiscal adjustment based 
equally on reductions in spending and transfers and increases in 
taxes, with different assumptions for the values of fiscal multipliers 
(ranging from 0.4 to 1.5). The results show that in all cases the 
debt-to-GDP ratio is reduced in the medium and long-term, al-
though when the ex-ante multiplier reaches 1.5 (which is achieved 
by imposing a very negative reaction of agents to the adjustment),2 
the public debt ratio may temporarily rise in the short term (see 
Panel 2). The conclusion of this analysis is that, although multipli-
ers are higher than on average in the past, they are still within 
reasonable ranges, so that in general self-defeating consolidations 
should not be expected in the case of Spain.
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BOX 1.2THE IMPACT OF FISCAL POLICY ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (cont’d)
2 The extreme nature of this simulation with a multiplier of 1.5 is apparent in 
the fact that the fall in activity is so marked that the ex-post budget deficit 
is hardly reduced, owing to the negative effect on taxes and benefits. The 
fact that in recent years a significant reduction in the budget deficit has 
been observed in Spain would be a further indication that the fiscal multi-
plier for the measures adopted has not reached such high levels.
The fiscal assumptions used in the latest “Spanish economic projections report” in the 
March Economic Bulletin placed the budget deficit at around 6% of GDP over the projec-
tion horizon (2013 and 2014), figures which, should they materialise, would not allow the 
growing trend of the public debt/GDP ratio to be curbed in the immediate future. This fiscal 
scenario reveals that, despite the intense fiscal consolidation undertaken, the scale of the 
adjustment pending is still most significant if it is intended to initiate a lasting reduction in 
public sector debt that is consistent with the requirements of the Law on Budgetary Stabil-
ity and Financial Sustainability and with the commitments entered into in the Stability and 
Growth Pact.
The adjustment of the imbalances accumulated in the Spanish banking system during the 
economic upturn was adversely affected by the concurrence of the double-dip recession 
in Spain and the euro confidence crisis. The quality of banking assets was further impaired 
and the capacity of Spanish banks to gain access to international funding markets was 
severely constrained. As has been the case since the start of its banking crisis, the ten-
sions exerted very different effects from bank to bank.
The worsening of the situation meant that the clean-up, recapitalisation and restructuring of 
the banking system had to be accelerated. One significant course of action turned on the 
clean-up of bank balance sheets. Royal Decree-Laws 2/2012 and 18/2012 laid down a swift 
Despite the effort made the 
size of the adjustment pending 
remains significant, but 
unavoidable
3.3  CLEAN-UP, 
RECAPITALISATION
AND RESTRUCTURING
OF THE BANKING SYSTEM2
The double-dip recession in 
the Spanish economy and the 
euro confidence crisis 
increased pressure on the 
banking system
The ongoing clean-up, 
recapitalisation and 
restructuring of the system 
2  For a more detailed analysis of the financial position of Spanish banks, see the 2011 Annual Report, the Financial 
Stability Report and the Report on Banking Supervision in Spain, published by the Banco de España, where 
these issues are addressed in greater depth.
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and transparent process of cleaning up potential capital losses associated with real estate 
assets, raising the levels of specific and general provisions. Subsequently, a detailed and 
rigorous stress test was conducted to evaluate the capacity of each individual bank to 
withstand reasonably extreme situations involving a further heightening of difficulties. Once 
the capital requirements to shore up each bank had been identified in this way, the following 
step of the strategy consisted of designing a mechanism and specific conditions for the 
recapitalisation and restructuring of the banks in question, and for the orderly resolution of 
those that were not viable. In parallel, procedures were set in place for the segregation and 
transfer out of banks under restructuring of assets and real estate loans. Finally, the finish-
ing touches were provided by the launch of a substantial reform of current regulations. 
Box 1.3 sets out the key aspects of these measures in greater detail.
Against an exceptionally fragile economic background in the euro area, dominated by the 
feedback loop between sovereign and banking risk, the Spanish economy’s capacity to 
finance this strategy through its own means was very limited. The Spanish government 
requested the support of its European partners and, in July, a financial assistance pro-
gramme for the recapitalisation of ailing Spanish banks was formalised. The programme 
was endowed with maximum resources totalling €100 billion and the conditions for the 
disbursement of the funds were set out in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), giving 
expression to the courses of action described above.
The MoU laid down a demanding timetable for compliance with the conditions estab-
lished, which has been strictly followed. In 2012 Q4 and 2013 Q1, the programme was 
reviewed, as stipulated in the MoU. And on both occasions, the joint European Commis-
sion, ECB, European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and European Banking Authority (EBA) 
missions delivered a positive assessment of fulfilment of the conditions, thereby enabling 
the effective disbursement of the funds.
The funds contributed by the ESM ultimately amounted to slightly over €41 billion. Of this 
amount, €39 billion were earmarked for recapitalisation by the FROB of the banks that 
could not cover their capital needs by their own means (the so-called “Groups 1 and 2”, 
following the MoU terminology). The remainder has financed the FROB’s participation in 
Sareb, the company created to manage the real estate assets segregated from bank bal-
ance sheets.
Among the recapitalisation efforts made in this new phase are private capital increases 
and the sales of assets by the Group 3 banks3 which, in this way, covered the capital short-
fall estimated in the stress tests without resorting to public aid. The need for public injec-
tions also diminished as a result of the assumption of losses by shareholders and holders 
of hybrid instruments. Furthermore, the regulatory reforms undertaken include the require-
ment, for all banks, of a minimum core capital ratio of 9% from January this year.
Greater impetus was also given to the downsizing of banking activity as a result, among 
other factors, of the restructuring plans approved for the banks in Groups 1 and 2. In terms 
of offices, employees and assets, these plans envisage reductions for end-2017 which, on 
average, range between 40% and 60% compared to the situation in 2010. The same can 
be said regarding the clean-up process which, as a result of the various measures adopted, 
has entailed a reduction in just one year of at least half of Spanish banks’ exposure, net of 
provisions, to the real estate sector.
was expedited by means of a 
strategy based on four 
pillars…
… which had the financial 
assistance of the ESM
Major progress has been 
made
3  Banks for which capital needs were identified, but which could be covered by their own means.
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During 2012 and the first few months of 2013 very significant pro-
gress was made in the process of balance-sheet clean-up, recap-
italisation and restructuring of the Spanish banking system, based 
essentially on four courses of action: identification of the individu-
al capital needs of each bank; recapitalisation and restructuring (or 
in the event of non-viability, orderly resolution) of those institutions 
in situations of greatest vulnerability; write-downs, separation and 
transfer of assets related to the real-estate sector and, finally, a 
significant regulatory reform.
Given that this plan of action required the mobilisation of public 
funds and that the financial tensions and heavy financing require-
ments of the public sector limited the capacity to obtain funds at 
reasonable prices on the markets, the Spanish government re-
quested financial assistance from its fellow EU members to carry 
it out. Specifically, the aid took the form of a financial assistance 
programme to recapitalise those banks that needed to be recapi-
talised, with funds available of up to €100 billion. The related con-
ditionality for the financial system was contained in the Memoran-
dum of Understanding (MoU) signed on 20 July 2012. This docu-
ment established the specific measures that would have to be 
adopted in two spheres: that relating to those institutions that 
have required public aid and that relating to the sector as a whole. 
The final objective of all these measures is to increase the resil-
ience of the financial system to adverse shocks.
In order to determine capital needs, the authorities commissioned 
independent experts to perform two stress tests. The first one, car-
ried out in June 2012 by two consultancy firms, was an aggregate 
top-down test in which Spanish banking groups that together ac-
counted for around 90% of the assets of the sector participated. 
Two macroeconomic scenarios were considered: a so-called base-
line scenario, assumed to have a high probability of occurrence, 
under which a core capital ratio (as defined by the European Bank-
ing Authority) of 9% was required to be met as at the end of 2014, 
and another adverse scenario, considered very unlikely to occur 
(its probability of occurrence was estimated to be less than 1%), 
under which the level of ratio had to be at least 6% as at the same 
date. According to the results, published on 21 June, the system 
was estimated to need additional capital of €16-26 billion under the 
first scenario, and €51-62 billion under the second one.
After this initial work, which served to put an upper limit on the 
system’s overall capital shortfall, the second stress test was 
BOX 1.3PROGRESS MADE IN THE BALANCE-SHEET CLEAN-UP, RECAPITALISATION AND RESTRUCTURING
OF THE SPANISH BANKING SYSTEM
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Banks with a FROB majority shareholding.
b Other banks with additional capital needs.
c Assets transferred to SAREB in February 2013 by Group 2 banks are not included. 
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carried out between July and the end of September, to deter-
mine the capital needs of each institution (bottom-up exercise). 
The scenarios, capital requirements and institutions considered 
were the same as in the first test and one of the consultancy 
firms that performed the first test was commissioned to con-
duct it, along with the four main Spanish audit firms and six 
domestic and international real estate valuation companies. 
The test was conducted very rigorously, using very exhaustive 
information, with strict control of the process, the governance 
of which involved both the Spanish authorities (Banco de Es-
paña, Ministry of Economic affairs and competitiveness and the 
FROB) and international authorities (European commission Eu-
ropean Central bank, European banking authority and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, in an advisory role). According to the 
results, which were published on 28 September, the maximum 
total capital needs were estimated to be €57 billion under the 
adverse scenario, which were distributed across the institutions 
very unevenly. More specifically, of the 17 groups analysed, 
seven (which accounted for 62% of the loan portfolio), had no 
need for additional own funds, while in the case of the other 
ten, the needs identified were concentrated (86% of the total) in 
four institutions in which the FROB already had majority hold-
ings at the time.
The second component of the strategy has been the recapitali-
sation of viable entities identified as having a capital gap. Of the 
ten institutions in that situation, two were capable of covering 
the gap on their own by means of capital increases, subordi-
nated debt repurchases and asset liquidation. The others need-
ed public aid provided by the FROB and financed through the 
MEDE, within the framework of the approved financial assis-
tance programme. The volume finally injected was, however, 
lower than that estimated in the stress tests, as a result of the 
application of a number of measures, in line with the agreements 
contained in the MoU, including the assumption of losses by the 
holders of shares and hybrid instruments, the transfer of assets 
to the institution set up for their management and sale (asset 
management company for assets arising from bank restructur-
ing (SAREB)) and the divestment of other assets. Following 
these adjustments, public aid was €39 billion (see Panel 1), of 
which €37 billion was given to the institutions in which the FROB 
had a majority holding (Group 1), and the rest, to those other 
banks that could not cover their capital needs on their own and 
that make up the so-called “Group 2”. The injections were com-
pleted in December 2012, in the first case, and March 2013 in 
the second (except in the case of one institution, for which the 
injection was made in April). The institutions that received public 
aid have presented, in accordance with the provisions of the 
MoU, restructuring plans that contain commitments to make 
very significant reductions in the number of offices, employees 
and risk-weighted assets during the period 2010-2017 (of 60%, 
50% and 60%, respectively, in the case of the Group 1 institu-
tions, and 40%, 40% and 50% in that of the Group 2 institu-
tions). These plans have already been approved by the Banco 
de España and the European Commission.
Following these new contributions from the FROB, the total 
amount of public aid provided in the form of capital since the start 
of the crisis amounts to €54 billion. In addition, the Deposit Guar-
antee Fund (DGF) had already carried out recapitalisations of 
€6 billion, to which must be added the private capital increases, 
which have involved a further €18 billion. In total, the recapitalisa-
tion of the financial system during this period exceeds €78 billion 
(see Panel 2).
The objective of the third pillar of the strategy was to clean up 
bank balance sheets and reduce their exposure to the real-estate 
sector. Royal Decree-Laws 2/2012 and 18/2012 introduced meas-
ures to ensure a rapid and transparent recognition of possible 
capital losses associated with real-estate assets, increasing the 
levels of the specific and general provisions and establishing the 
need for an additional capital buffer to cover possible losses as-
sociated with assets relating to land. With the application of the 
new rules, the coverage of assets relating to real-estate develop-
ment would reach 45% of their total amount, and 80% in the case 
of land.1 Subsequently, and in accordance with the MoU, in De-
cember 2012 the SAREB was set up, a company whose purpose 
is to manage real-estate assets, which currently has a capital of 
€4.8 billion, 44% of which is held by the FROB (the rest being 
mostly held by private investors, banks and insurance companies). 
The institutions that have received new public aid have been re-
quired to transfer to this company all their foreclosed real-estate 
assets and loans to developers with a net book value of more than 
€100,000 and €250,000, respectively, as well as controlling share-
holdings linked to the real-estate development sector. The transfer 
price was calculated, following the conditions of the MoU, accord-
ing to the economic value of the assets, to which some additional 
adjustments were applied, with an average cut of 65% in relation 
to the book value for the foreclosed assets and 48% of loans. In 
December 2012 and February 2013 the assets of the Group 1 and 
2 institutions were transferred, respectively, with a total effective 
amount of €51 billion.2 For the SAREB a business plan has been 
designed with a 15-year horizon and its management is super-
vised by the Banco de España, along with other domestic and in-
ternational authorities.
As a result of all these measures and, to a lesser extent, the sale of 
assets and other actions, the total net exposure (after applying 
provisions) of the bank balance sheets to the real-estate sector 
has been reduced, during 2012, by €127.2 billion, as may be seen 
in Panels 3 and 4.3
Finally, the fourth component of the strategy was focused on regu-
latory reform. Specifically, RDL 24/2012, approved on 31 August 
BOX 1.3PROGRESS MADE IN THE BALANCE-SHEET CLEAN-UP, RECAPITALISATION AND RESTRUCTURING
OF THE SPANISH BANKING SYSTEM (cont’d)
1  This limit was reached through the requirement for an additional capital 
buffer. However, as this requirement was lifted by RDL 24/2012, the cov-
erage of land is now 60%.
2  The assets were recorded on the balance sheets of institutions with a 
gross amount of €106 billion.
3  In order to calculate this amount the transfer to the SAREB of the Group 
2 assets, which took place in February 2013 has been taken into account.
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2012, established a modern framework for the management and 
resolution of banking crises (with more rapid intervention by the 
Banco de España in the event that difficulties are detected at an 
institution), delimited the competencies of the FROB and of the 
DGF and strengthened the tools of the former in all phases of crisis 
management. In addition, the Banco de España assumed the 
power to authorise and sanction credit institutions (a function pre-
viously performed by the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Com-
petitiveness), and a more demanding capital requirement was es-
tablished that credit institutions had to meet from 1 January of this 
year, a minimum level being set for core capital4 of 9%. This royal 
decree also addresses other aspects, such as placing limits on the 
remuneration of the directors of institutions that have received fi-
nancial support and improving the mechanisms for protecting re-
tail investors, by requiring greater transparency in the marketing of 
products not covered by the DGF. More recently, Circular 6/2012 
was approved, which introduced greater transparency into the fi-
nancial reporting of institutions, especially in relation to real-estate 
exposures and refinanced and restructured loans. In the coming 
months new legislation is expected to be approved to convert sav-
ings banks, whose activity is now carried out through commercial 
banks in practically every case, into foundations, which will have 
significant incentives to reduce their holdings in such commercial 
banks below controlling levels, thereby completing the process of 
reform of the model of governance of this type of institution that 
was commenced in 2010. Finally, work is currently done to im-
prove the supervisory methods of the Banco de España and the 
system of provisions for loan impairment.4 As defined by the European Banking Authority.
PROGRESS MADE IN THE BALANCE-SHEET CLEAN-UP, RECAPITALISATION AND RESTRUCTURING
OF THE SPANISH BANKING SYSTEM (cont’d)
BOX  1.3
In an economy such as Spain where banks are so prevalent and strongly established, the 
successful culmination of the clean-up, recapitalisation and restructuring of banks is a vital 
condition for being able to raise under reasonable conditions the external funds needed 
and for these funds to be efficiently channelled towards private-sector spending projects. 
Precisely for this reason, the significant progress in recent months should serve to further 
the strategy adopted and to address the challenges remaining, including most notably 
those associated with the uncertainty over the future course of the fragile macroeconomic 
environment.
The unfavourable course of Spanish household and corporate income weighed down for 
yet another year on the ongoing reduction of their related debt ratios, a process which 
continued to be relatively slow. In the current settings of the Spanish economy, which is 
immersed in a double-dip recession and in the process of restoring lost competitiveness 
and reinforcing the banking system, neither growth, inflation nor the restructuring of debt 
offer viable alternatives in the short term to cutting the non-financial private sector’s lever-
age ratios. Their reduction, therefore, is drawing in the main on the contraction of credit 
flows, which restricts the speed at which the process may advance, particularly in the case 
of household mortgage debts.
The financing received by households and firms fell, in fact, by around 5% over the year 
as a whole (see Chart 1.9). Along with the need for the sector to deleverage, other factors 
also influenced financing. On one hand, the weak economic outlook had a negative effect 
on the demand for new loans and on the creditworthiness of borrowers. On the other, the 
strict funding conditions for Spanish banks on international markets, though mitigated in 
part by the ECB’s decisions, were reflected in their lending policies, thereby shaping a 
markedly restrictive setting for the granting of loans. As is habitual in these circumstances, 
the effects of these developments have tended to be asymmetrically distributed among 
the different borrowers, particularly affecting those which, as is the case with SMEs, face 
greater structural difficulties in overcoming such effects.
The implementation of the bank restructuring plans might, in principle, accelerate the con-
tractionary trend of credit, although their quantitative influence need not, a priori, be very 
In any event, challenges 
remain; and these must be 
tackled to entrench the 
success of the process
3.4  THE DELEVERAGING OF 
HOUSEHOLDS AND FIRMS
The double-dip recession 
weighed down on household 
and corporate deleveraging, 
which continued to reside 
essentially on the fall-off in 
credit
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significant. The banks affected account for only around one-third of the system’s total 
credit portfolio and the remaining banks could absorb and offset part of this impact. How-
ever, and above all, the bank restructuring plans, under the overall strategy of placing the 
economy back on a normal footing, will contribute to restoring investor confidence in 
Spanish banks as a whole, thereby broadening their possibilities of raising, under acces-
sible conditions, the funds that they can then lend to the private sector.
Correcting Spanish households’ and firms’ excess indebtedness is, in any event, a neces-
sary step for upholding the sustained recovery in domestic demand, although in the short 
run it may restrict the sector’s spending potential. This effect will, in any case, depend on 
how the aggregate contraction in credit is distributed across the different sectors and 
types of debtors. The data on the distribution of debt show that there is a high degree of 
heterogeneity among both households and firms. And some recent studies suggest for 
example that, in the case of corporations, the deleveraging observed at the aggregate 
level in recent years has been compatible with an increase in the credit received by corpo-
rations starting from a healthier position.4
Economic policy has a pivotal role to play in seeing through the adjustments, dispelling 
uncertainty and laying the foundations for a sustainable recovery that allows for an in-
crease in the economy’s growth capacity in the medium and long term. Restoring confi-
dence and overcoming the current tensions, which have a significant external compo-
nent linked to the euro crisis, depends on the progress made towards a more complete 
and sustainable economic union, which is beyond the scope of the national authorities. 
But the speedier the adjustment of the Spanish economy and the headway on reforms, 
the greater will be the protection afforded against external shocks and the possibility of 
benefiting from European progress.
As highlighted throughout this chapter, the adoption of extraordinary economic policy 
measures helped stave off the dangers of the serious confidence and external funding 
crisis undergone by the Spanish economy amid the most acute tensions experienced by 
the euro area since it was founded. There has been progress on fiscal consolidation and 
The short-term costs of the 
necessary aggregate 
deleveraging will also depend 
on how this is distributed 
among individual debtors
4  The role of economic 
policy
Economic policy has a key 
role to play in laying the 
foundations for a sustainable 
recovery
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4  See, for example, A. Menéndez and Méndez, M. (2013): “Spanish non-financial corporations’ debt since the start 
of the crisis. A disaggregated analysis”, Economic Bulletin, January, Banco de España.
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2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
DEMAND AND OUTPUT (b)
    GDP 3.5 0.9 -3.7 -0.3 0.4 -1.4
    Private consumption 3.5 -0.6 -3.8 0.7 -1.0 -2.1
    Government consumption 5.6 5.9 3.7 1.5 -0.5 -3.7
    Gross capital formation 4.2 -4.2 -17.9 -5.5 -5.5 -8.7
    Equipment investment 10.2 -2.9 -23.9 2.6 2.3 -6.6
    Construction investment 2.4 -5.8 -16.6 -9.8 -9.0 -11.5
    Housing 1.4 -9.1 -23.1 -10.1 -6.7 -8.0
    Other construction 3.6 -1.6 -9.1 -9.6 -11.0 -14.6
    Exports of goods and services 6.7 -1.0 -10.0 11.3 7.6 3.1
    Imports of goods and services 8.0 -5.2 -17.2 9.2 -0.9 -5.0
    Contribution of national demand to GDP growth 4.3 -0.6 -6.6 -0.6 -1.9 -3.9
    Contribution of net external demand to GDP growth -0.8 1.5 2.9 0.3 2.3 2.5
    Total employment 3.0 -0.2 -6.3 -2.5 -1.7 -4.4
    Employment rate (d) 66.6 65.3 60.6 59.4 58.5 56.2
    Unemployment rate 8.3 11.3 18.0 20.1 21.6 25.0
    Compensation per employee 4.7 6.9 4.2 0.3 0.7 -0.3
    Apparent labour productivity 0.5 1.1 2.7 2.3 2.2 3.2
    Unit labour costs 4.2 5.7 1.5 -2.0 -1.4 -3.4
    GDP de????? 3.3 2.4 0.1 0.4 1.0 0.1
    Consumer price index (12-month % change) 4.2 1.4 0.8 3.0 2.4 2.9
    Consumer price index (annual average) 2.8 4.1 -0.3 1.8 3.2 2.4
    Consumer price differential with the euro area (HICP) 0.7 0.9 -0.5 0.4 0.3 -0.1
    Resident sectors: domestic net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) -9.6 -9.2 -4.3 -3.8 -3.2 -0.2
        General government 1.9 -4.5 -11.2 -9.7 -9.4 -10.6
            General government (without a? ??????????al institutions) 1.9 -4.5 -11.2 -9.7 -9.0 -7.0
        Households and NPISHs -2.7 1.2 6.6 3.9 2.4 0.9
        Companies -8.8 -5.9 0.2 2.0 3.8 9.5
            Financial institutions 1.9 1.8 1.3 0.9 2.0 6.1
???????????????????????????????ations -10.7 -7.7 -1.1 1.1 1.8 3.5
    Net international investment position -78.1 -79.3 -93.7 -88.8 -91.3 -93.0
    General government gross debt 36.3 40.2 53.9 61.5 69.3 84.2
    ECB minimum bid rate on MROs 3.9 3.9 1.2 1.0 1.3 0.9
    Ten-year governemnt bond yield 4.3 4.4 4.0 4.2 5.4 5.8
    Synthetic bank lending rate 5.7 6.2 3.8 3.3 4.1 4.1
    Madrid Stock Exchange General Index (Dec 1985 = 100) 1.631.8 1.278.3 1.042.4 1.076.5 971.8 767.5
    Dollar/euro exchange rate 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.3
    Nominal effective exchange rate vis-à-vis developed countries (g) 101.9 103.3 103.4 101.9 101.7 100.3
    Real effective exchange rate vis-à-vis developed countries (h) 114.9 119.1 116.3 112.8 109.8 102.8
    Real effective exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro area (h) 112.7 115.1 111.8 110.3 107.5 102.1
???????????? ?????????????cing 12.5 4.4 -0.3 0.2 -2.4 -3.7
?????????????????corporations: tota?????????? 17.7 8.2 -1.4 0.6 -2.0 -6.2
MONETARY AND FINANCIAL INDICATORS (f)
EMPLOYMENT, WAGES, COSTS AND PRICES (c)
NET LENDING (+) OR NET BORROWING (-) AND FINANCIAL BALANCE (e)
MAIN INDICATORS OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY (a) TABLE 1.1 
SOURCES: INE, IGAE, AMECO and Banco de España.
a Spanish National Accounts data, base year 2008.
b Volume indices. Rate of change.
c Rate of change, except the unemployment rate, which is a level.
d Employment rate (16-64).
e Levels as a percentage of GDP.
f Annual average levels for the Madrid Stock Exchange General Index, interest rates and exchange rates, and rates of change for ?nanancial assets and liabilities.  
g 1999 Q1 = 100.
h 1999 Q1 = 100. Measured with unit labour costs.
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labour market reform, and important steps have been taken to restructure the credit sys-
tem, although there are adjustments outstanding and the culmination of the process will 
not be free from difficulties. Elsewhere, the reforms in the goods and services markets 
have made less impact. Against this background, restoring growth foundations in a lasting 
way requires furthering the effort expended and finalising the adjustments under way, in 
line with the recommendations of the European Commission for Spain under the Macroe-
conomic Imbalances Procedure. The aim is to prevent the risk of the imbalances detected 
proving excessive. The high dependence on external funding is a factor of vulnerability 
that requires the careful handling of all the economic policy instruments available to pre-
vent new bouts of financial instability from exerting adverse effects on confidence and on 
the availability and cost of funding in Spain.
Economic policy should ensure that equilibria, the financing of the economy and the flex-
ible functioning of the markets for factors, goods and services that growth within the Mon-
etary Union requires are all restored.
Notable among the many economic policy requirements is the need to complete the re-
structuring of the banking system, under the strategy adopted, to normalise the necessary 
financing of domestic expenditure.
Maintaining adjustment and growth-boosting policies via supply-side and structural re-
form measures, in an economic setting of high unemployment and flat income, is very 
costly in the short term and entails considerable risks of fatigue that may erode the ca-
pacity to act. The types of measures needed to restore the foundations of growth require 
time for their effects to work through, and they should not be judged against the weak-
ness of the economy in circumstances still dominated by the problems built up in the past 
and the uncertainty surrounding the European project. The experience of previous critical 
episodes taught us that perseverance with adjustment measures, even though initially 
costly, managed to contain investor and market mistrust and to redress complex and 
dangerous situations.
After five consecutive years of job destruction, the unemployment rate has reached 
unacceptable levels and the risk of long-term unemployment becoming chronic is a 
very serious concern, all the more so if the high incidence of youths and the least-
skilled in this group is considered. The achievements of the labour reform in respect of 
internal flexibility and wage restraint are encouraging, but the results obtained in fo-
menting new hires are still not sufficient, although this is probably one of the areas in 
which the measures need time to work through in full. Nonetheless, the seriousness of 
the labour market situation advises maintaining and intensifying reform momentum 
through the adoption of additional measures to promote job creation in the short term 
and to facilitate wage flexibility. Here it would be worth exploring the possibility of es-
tablishing new formulas that would allow, in special cases, temporary departures from 
the conditions laid down in collective bargaining agreements, or exceptional mecha-
nisms to prevent the minimum wage from acting as a constraint on specific groups of 
workers with most difficulties in terms of employability. Further steps should also be 
taken to ensure that the diminished scope of the wage indexation clauses is not re-
versed in phases of economic growth.
Improving competitiveness is a fundamental objective for boosting growth. Economic pol-
icies should promote a greater sensitivity of prices, margins and wages to cyclical condi-
tions to smooth the reallocation of resources towards projects and sectors with more 
It is vital to complete the bank 
restructuring process
It is imperative to persevere 
with supply-side and structural 
reform measures…
… so that the adverse 
trajectory of the labour market 
may be reversed…
… so that competitiveness is 
boosted through the greater 
adjustment capacity of relative
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growth potential. Likewise, policies geared to promoting productivity gains arising from 
genuine improvements in productive efficiency are essential for ensuring that gains in 
competitiveness are lasting and lay the foundations for growth in the medium and long 
term. It should be borne in mind that gains in competitiveness must come about in a con-
tractionary setting for domestic spending and at the same time as the high levels of debt 
of various institutional sectors are being reduced, which underscores the leading role sup-
ply-side and structural reform policies must play here.
In this area, however, reforms have been less penetrating or are at a more incipient stage, 
although the National Programme of Reforms (NPR), approved on 30 April, sets out a 
series of measures and a timetable for their implementation in 2013 that may resolve 
some of the most pressing issues outstanding. Indeed, as the NPR acknowledges, the 
bodies entrusted with overseeing competition and with regulating the network industries 
are under review. The new law, envisaged for June this year, should shore up their inde-
pendence and improve their functioning, in order to ensure competition and to push 
through further sectoral liberalisation. In this respect, certain liberalising measures have 
been adopted in the services sector. These include most notably the substitution of prior 
communications for authorisations or licences in the case of small retail outlets, the ex-
tension of trading hours and the liberalisation of retail trade sales periods, and the lifting 
of obstacles to the setting up of service stations, among other measures, in the case of 
oil and fuel retailing. The draft bill for ensuring a single market envisages a single licence 
throughout Spanish territory for access to business activity, which would help signifi-
cantly lessen the administrative burden on corporations, and which should be completed 
by making the array of regulations from one region to another uniform in relation to the 
carrying out of economic activities. Also pending is the liberalisation of professional ser-
vices, though it does feature among the reforms envisaged by the NPR over the next 12 
months. In the case of the energy industry, despite the various measures adopted to re-
duce the tariff deficit, a far-reaching reform of the electricity sector is needed to ensure 
sustainability and the degree of competition. Finally, regarding the housing market, recent 
tax changes have contributed significantly to bringing the tax treatment of owner-occu-
pancy and rentals onto an equal footing. In combination with the new Law on Urban Rent-
als in passage through Parliament, which adds flexibility to contractual terms and the 
setting of rents, this should contribute to achieving a more balanced mix between owner-
occupancy and rentals.
The reduction in the deficit in 2012 by more than 2 pp of GDP, against a background of 
economic recession and a strong increase in the public debt interest burden, has signifi-
cantly enhanced the credibility of the fiscal consolidation process; not only because of the 
scale of the adjustment made, but also because the effort has been across all tiers of 
government, in particular local and regional government, where doubts had arisen con-
cerning their capacity to make the adjustment required.
However, in a setting such as the present, in which economic agents and financial markets 
remain highly sensitive to fiscal and macroeconomic developments in the different econo-
mies, it is very important to entrench the gains in credibility attained. What would contrib-
ute to this would be the setting of a medium-term budgetary horizon that provided suffi-
cient details on the necessary measures which, in a lasting way, were to allow the fiscal 
consolidation process to be culminated. Such measures should furthermore be based on 
a deep-seated review of the size of the public sector, of the different spending pro-
grammes and of the tax system, so as to ensure not only the success of the process but 
also an improvement in the quality of public finances. The rigorous and transparent ap-
prices, margins and costs and 
genuine productivity gains…
… and so that the credibility 
gains achieved in the fiscal 
field become entrenched
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plication of the instruments included in the Stability Law, for instances in which non-
compliance with the objectives set are observed, would likewise help attain this objective, 
all the more so following the approval of various funds supporting the financing of local 
and regional government by the State. The budgetary framework should also emerge 
stronger following the setting up of an Independent Fiscal Responsibility Authority, before 
the end of the year, under the commitment entered into in the latest Updated Stability 
Programme 2013-2016 sent by the government to the European Commission on 30 April. 
The mandate, resources and governance of this Authority should be defined in keeping 
with international standards.
The foregoing measures should be accompanied by new ones aimed at ensuring the sus-
tainability of the pensions system, measures that would complement those needed in the 
labour market. Such measures would be very powerful in terms of the sustainability of 
public finances and would afford great certainty as to the reformist resolve of economic 
policy, without an appreciable impact on current labour and social conditions. In particular, 
and as envisaged in the Updated Stability Programme, an appropriate definition of the so-
called “sustainability factor” should be approved so as to enable automatic modifications 
of the parameters of the system that guarantee its sustainability in the medium and long 
term. It would further be advisable to bring forward the entry into force of the later retire-
ment age and the lengthening of the period for calculating the regulatory base, both of 
which were approved in the last pensions system reform. This is because, in light of the 
heightening of the problem since the last reform was enacted, the phase-in period agreed 
is overly long.
Foreseeably, furthering the scope of these priority economic policy measures will allow a 
gradual recovery in internal and external confidence, and the normalisation of the funding 
of the economy. It will also lay the foundations for resuming economic growth in the me-
dium term, thereby providing for improved expectations, the clean-up of private-sector 
balance sheets, the soundness and profitability of the banking system and the sustainabil-
ity of public finances.
Additional measures should 
be taken to ensure the 
sustainability of the pensions 
system
